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SPECIAL COMMENT
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
IN KENTUCKY
By PAUL J. WEBER*
AND JANET R. OLSON**
INTRODUCTION

As state and local governments across the nation face increasing financial pressures, officials have begun to search for
new sources of revenue. At the same time, property owners
have grown aggressively resistant to tax increases.' Although
Kentucky has not yet witnessed major taxpayer agitation, it
faces the same financial pressures. Consequently the large
quantity of tax-exempt property, including religious property,
is being pondered as a possible source of new revenue. 2 To
provide the context for an investigation of possible state taxation of religious property, this article examines the development and extent of religious property tax exemptions in Kentucky.

I.
A.

KENTUCKY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

ProvisionsRegarding Church Property

Kentucky's present constitution, adopted in 1891, contains the "no preference" clause from earlier constitutions in
section 5:
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Louisville. B.A. 1962,
M.A. 1966, St. Louis University; Ph.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
** Research Assistant, Dept. of Political Science, University of Louisville.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 25, 1977, at 69-70; U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, Jan. 17, 1977, at 81.
2 Cf. Lile, How Much Do We Know About Tax Exempt Property in Kentucky? 4

Puauc AFTARS ANALYsT No. 1 1 (1977) (published by University of Kentucky Press).

Projecting figures from Warren County to the entire state, Lile "guesstimates" that
the value of exempt property in Kentucky is $10,600,000,000. He assumes that 50% of
the value of taxable real property is tax-exempt. In Warren County, 75% of the taxexempt property is government owned.
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No preference shall ever be given by law to any religious sect,
society or denomination . . . nor shall any person be compelled to attend. . . [or] contribute to the erection or maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or support of any
minister or religion .... I
The pertinent provisions for property tax exemptions are
contained in section 170:
There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for
public purposes; places actually used for religious worship,
with the grounds attached thereto and used and appurtenant
to the house of worship, not exceeding 1/2 acre in cities or
towns, and not exceeding 2 acres in the country; places of
burial not held for private or corporate profit, institutions of
purely public charity, and institutions of education not used
or employed for gain. . and the income of such property as
is used exclusively for their maintenance; all parsonages or
residences owned by any religious society, and occupied as a
home, and for no other purpose, by the minister of any religion, with not exceeding 1/2 acre of ground in towns and cities
and 2 acres of ground in the country appurtenantthereto...
and all laws exempting or omitting property from taxation
other than the property above mentioned shall be void.4
B.

HistoricalBackground

Even in 1891, the religious property tax exemption was the
subject of considerable debate. The corporation as a legal entity was still in its formative stage at the time of Kentucky's
Constitutional Convention. Churches and religious organizations were considered corporations, and like corporations, were
feared by the state'slargely rural populace because of their
5
rapid growth in urban areas.
This fear was reinforced by the corporations' use of
special permits from the General Assembly to escape taxation.' In an attempt to curtail such practices by the legislaKy. CONST. § 5.
Ky. CONST. § 170 (emphasis added). Note that the clause providing exemption
for income-producing property used exclusively for the maintenance of certain institutions applies only to nonprofit cemeteries and charitable and educational institutions.
It does not apply to religious organizations.
3

I See 2 DEBATEs CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2404-06 (1890) (hereinafter cited as
CONsTrrunoNAL CoNvENTIoN).
' 1 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supranote 5, at 1183-84, 1200-01 (remarks of Mr.
Washington and Mr. Buckner). But see id. at 1197 (remarks of Mr. Beckner). Allegedly
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ture, the Convention wrote into the constitution that "no
property shall be exempt from taxation except as provided in
this constitution."' It was within this context that the religious property tax exemption became a part of the 1891 constitution.
C.

The Controversy Over Religious PropertyExemptions

On January 9, 1891, the Committee on Revenue and Taxation reported the following provision:
There shall be exempt from taxation public property used for
a public purpose, actualplaces of religious worship, places of
burial not held for private or corporate profit, and institutions of purely public charity; and all laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property above mentioned,
shall be void .... I
The Convention discussed this section of the report from
January 9th to January 14th, focusing primarily on the provision for religious property tax exemption.9 The arguments currently propounded on the religious exemption issue were nearly
all advanced in the Convention debates.
The opposition to any religious exemption was led by Mr.
Johnston of Fayette County, chairman of the revenue committee, who argued against exemption for any non-governmental
property because "[a]n exemption is a tax levied on a part of
the citizens who have no interest in it, for the benefit of others
who have, on the whole State, for the advantage of a favored
locality."'" Specifically, Johnston believed that these exemptions discriminated against those who had no interest in religious institutions, as well as against those who lived beyond the
reach of services provided by charitable institutions. A relimore than $232 million in corporate property escaped taxation because it was "devoted
to a public purpose." See LEGISLATIVE REsEARcH COMMISSION, INFORMATIONAL BULLTN
No. 112, THE CONSrruTION OF KENTucKY xii (1976).
7 1 CONSITUNONAL CONVENTON, supra note 5, at 1183, 1204. This limitation is

currently in KY. CONST. § 3. See also id. at 1184-1203. While thus eliminating legislative power to exempt property from taxation, the language did not deny to local
governments the power to grant special privileges such as exclusive contracts in order
to encourage capital investment.
2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTON, supra note 5, at 2372 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2372-2575.
0 Id. at 2382.
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gious exemption, Johnston argued, amounted to a tax on the
citizenry to support teachings which the taxpayers might believe to be "pernicious and wrong.""
Johnston attempted to capitalize on the urban-rural conflict running throughout the Convention by intimating that the
effect of the exemption would be to favor the cities at,the
expense of rural areas, since religious institutions were located
mainly in the cities, and could result in an exemption for a
quarter of all property in urban areas."2 Nevertheless, Johnston
concluded that a limited exemption for the buildings used for
worship was essential to secure popular support for the constitution.'3
Simon B. Buckner, delegate from Hart County and Governor of the State, opposed the exemption on different grounds,
arguing that the government had no right to exempt the property of any corporation-not even a religious organization. He
advanced the separatist argument: Kentucky was not a Christian government, but one which assured equal rights and privileges before the law to all religions." In addition, Buckner
warned of the evils which historically have followed from vast
accumulations of property in the hands of religious communities, and urged that taxation of church property was essential
to avoid these evils. Finally, echoing Johnston's fee-for-services
argument, Buckner concluded that all currently exempted organizations ought to pay for the protections given them by the
State rather than throw their share of the burden on the whole
people."
On the other side of the argument, Ignatius A. Spalding,
Catholic delegate from Union County, contended that the exemptions were justified as appropriate contributions by the
state to the moral objectives of the churches, asserting further
that the activities of the churches would otherwise have to be
taken over by the state," an argument which was frequently
advanced by supporters of religious tax exemptions. 7 Since
Id.
2

Id. at 2383.

13Id.
" Id. at 2402.
, Id. at 2404-07.
Id. at 2386-87.
" See Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution,78 YALE L.J. 1286 (1969).
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government is prohibited from recognizing any particular religion and cannot accomplish religious objectives directly,
Spalding continued, it falls within the province of religious
societies to provide moral guidance.'" To tax religious organizations would destroy the good such organizations perform."
Representative Thomas Pettit of Daviess County contended that the principle of separation of church and state
precludes taxing the church. 20 Pettit also used a productivity
rationale to argue that since church buildings yield no revenue
for anyone they should not be taxed.2' By taxing churches, the
government would discourage the contributions upon which
churches rely: it would amount to a double burden on the people who contribute to their support. First they would contribute money to build and support a church, then they would have
to contribute again to pay the taxes, resulting in a tax on chari2
table giving.
Less sophisticated arguments were propounded by Mr.
Hendrick of Fleming County, who informed the Convention
that the initiative to tax church property in the United States
"originated in an infidel, free-thinking club in the city of New
York, '"2 and a Mr. Durbin of Grayson County who added that
"[t]he idea that churches are corporations, and should be
24
taxed as such, is revolting.
The Convention delegates also debated whether or not to
separate churches frcim other charitable institutions. Churches
often have sponsored charitable organizations which, while not
"purely public" in that they are not controlled by the public,
dispense charity to all those qualified without regard to sectar112 CONsTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 5, at 2386. For a recent argument
along these lines, see H. BFmAN,THE INTERACION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974).
" 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 5, at 2385-92.

Id. at 2446.
Id. Historically property tax exemptions have been based on two main arguments: "productivity" and "benefits." Under the productivity rationale, property
should be taxed in proportion to its actual income-earning ability. Under the benefit
rationale, property should be exempted because the services such property provides
would otherwise have to be offered by the state or would simply be unavailable. See
Quigley & Schmenner, Property Tax Exemption and Public Policy, 23 PuBuc PoucY
259-61 (1975).
u 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEnON, supra note 5, at 2446-47.
" Id. at 2413.
21Id. at 2458.
22

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66

ian boundaries. Some delegates felt that such church-related
charitable institutions might not qualify under the term
"purely public charity," and therefore needed explicit constitutional protection as religious institutions. 5 However, the
Convention did not explicitly exempt religious charitable institutions and it was left to the courts to clarify what qualifies as
a "purely public charity."2
The Convention delegates also faced the task of defining
the extent of the exemption, i.e., how much church property
would be exempted from taxation. The delegates attempted to
decide what constituted a reasonable amount of church property for purposes of exemption, and discussed varying this
amount according to location, due to the difference in value
between urban and rural properties. Mr. C. T. Allen of Caldwell County convinced the delegates that exemptions in the
past had been excessive and that only non-revenue-producing
property ought to be exempt. In addition, he reasoned, there
should be limits on the amount of property a religious organization could own, which would preclude the possibility of such
institutions owning unlimited amounts of revenue-producing
property even if that income could be used only for religious or
charitable purposes.27 The potential disparity in the dollar
amount of an exemption between larger, more ostentatious
urban churches and their smaller, humbler, rural counterparts
was the subject of considerable debate."8
The Convention eventually adopted language virtually
identical to the language of the present section 170 of the constitution. 29 Perhaps as a result of political expedience, their
21

Id. at 2454.

11See Iroquois Post No. 229 v. City of Louisville, 309 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. 1958). The
court held that "purely" modified "charity" and not "public." An earlier court had
defined a "purely public charity" as one which dispenses a "duty which the Commonwealth owes to its indigent and helpless citizens." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 83 S.W.
572 (Ky. 1904).
21 2 CONsTTurioNAL CONVErnON, supra note 5, at 2451-52. In this regard it is
interesting to note that the 1893 legislature passed a statute limiting the amount of
property a religious society could own to 50 acres. 1893 Ky. Acts ch. 200, § 3 at 910.
See note 31 infra for the text and history of this statute.
McCracken County delegate W.G. Bullit argued that simple rural churches aid
the Commonwealth in reducing crime more than the magnificent edifices of the city,
since rural Sunday Schools drew children from the class of people most likely to turn
criminal. 2 CONSMTtrONAL CONVzrnoN, supra note 5, at 2459.
Id. at 2575.
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language went beyond the limited exemption proposed by Mr.
Johnston, establishing the exemption as a basic principle of the
Kentucky Constitution.
II.

INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

170

By exempting only a small amount of church property,
section 170 limits the ability of churches to accumulate land.
Previously Kentucky had imposed a more direct limitation on
the accumulation of land by churches. At one time, Kentucky
limited church holdings of real property to fifty acres. 3'
This fifty-acre limitation was ineffective in preventing
acquisitions and accumulation of property by churches in several situations. The statute only limited the accumulation of
land. Thus, if a testator devised land to trustees with directions
to pay rents and profits to certain churches, the statute applied; but there was no such restriction if the testator directed
that the land be sold with the proceeds divided among certain
churches.3 2
The statute was also inapplicable when the benefit of a
devise, gift, etc. inured to a charitable, rather than purely religious, purpose. Foreshadowing a similar outcome under section
170, the Kentucky Court validated a devise of realty to a
church in trust for a particular charitable purpose. 33 Such de3 The fundamental basis for the exemption was evident in statements like the one
of J.D. Clardy of Christian County:
[W]hile some gentlemen have been in favor of exempting churches and
school property, they have placed exemption. . . upon a ground upon which
I am not willing to allow it to rest. They say that it is proper that all property
of this kind should be taxed; but they are willing, as a matter of policy, that
these particular things shall be exempted from taxation. I protest. . . . I
do not believe anything ought to be exempted from taxation as a matter of
policy. It ought to be exempted as a matter of right and justice or it ought
not be exempted at all.
Id. at 2453 (emphasis added).
31 1893 Ky. Acts ch. 200, § 3 at 910 (codified at Ky. Rav. STAT. § 273.090, repealed
by 1968 Ky. Acts ch. 165, § 70) provided "[n]o church or society of Christians shall
be capable of taking or holding the title, legal or equitable, to exceeding fifty acres of
ground; but may acquire and hold that quantity for the purpose of erecting thereon
houses of public worship, public instruction, parsonage or grave-yard."
For a listing of other restrictive statutes, see A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 362.4
at 2829 n.10, (3d ed. 1967).
Street v. Cave Hill Investment Co., 230 S.W. 536 (Ky. 1921).
Spradlin v. Wiman, 114 S.W.2d 1111 (Ky. 1938).
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vises were permitted because of their charitable use, and thus
the state was not engaging in a primary function of a religious
organization,
which would have been an impermissible activ34
ity.

Currently, the only restrictions on the ability of churches
to accumulate lands are taxes on non-exempt church property,
since the fifty-acre limitation was repealed in 1968. 35 Section
170 provides for taxation on all church property, exempting
only "places actually used for religious worship" up to two
acres, and residences of ministers up to two acres.3 6 Like most
tax exemptions, the religious exemption is strictly construed
against the exemptee, with any doubt to be resolved in favor
of the state. 7
However, section 170 exempts "institutions of purely public charity, and institutions of education not used or employed
for gain." 3 The charitable and educational exemptions are
broader in scope than the religious exemption because charities
and schools "perform [a] function which relieves the taxpayers of a portion of their burden." 39 When a church uses property
to provide such a service, that property may therefore be eligible for an exemption independent of the religious exemption.
Religious ownership does not disqualify church property
from exemaption as an institution of "purely public charity" or
"education." Use, rather than ownership, is determinative in
the application of this second section 170 exemption. In some
situations, however, it is difficult to determine when religious
property is being used for education or a purely public charity.
It is clear that property used for advancement of religion does
not qualify for such an exemption. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Thomas, the Court held that a trust fund to
be used "in the advancement of the principles of primitive
Christianity, as taught by the Christian Church" was not a
Bittker, supra note 17, at 1286.
See note 31 supra for the history of the mortmain statute.
Ky. CONST. § 170.
City of Ashland v. Calvary Protestant Episcopal Church, 278 S.W.2d 708, 710
(Ky 1955); Trinity Temple Charities, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 188 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Ky.
1945).
11 Ky. CoNST. § 170.
39 City of Louisville v. Presbyterian Orphans Home Soc'y, 186 S.W.2d 194, 199
(Ky. 1945).
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purely public charity and thus not exempt from taxation. 0 To
be sure, the trust was a charity, but did not meet the standard
for a purely public charity, i.e.: "one which discharges, in
whole or in part, a duty which the commonwealth owes to the
indigent and helpless citizens." 4' There is no such duty on the
part of the commonwealth to teach or disseminate religion, and
thus the advancement of religion cannot be a "purely public
charity." In addition, the Court noted that it would be
"entirely useless to specify the exemption of a house of worship,
and the parsonage, if all church property is exempt under the
general expression 'purely public charity.' "42 Thus, property
held by a church to produce income for the advancement of
religion is fully taxable,43 but property owned by a church
which produces income for a school is exempt."
The taxation of religious property is determined by the
same criteria as the applicability of the now repealed statute
which had limited total church holdings. Property used for the
advancement of religion is subject to the acreage limitation of
the section 170 religious exemption just as it was formerly subject to the fifty-acre limitation. 5 However, religious property
held to discharge an educational or financial (charitable) obligation of the state receives an exemption from taxation'totally
independent of the limited religious exemption of section 170.6
III.
A.

RECENT TRENDS TOWARD MODIFICATION OF THE RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION

Attempted ConstitutionalRevision

A Constitutional Revision Assembly began drafting a new
constitution in 1964. Although Kentucky has not had a new
constitution since 1891, and has experienced considerable de83 S.W. 572 (Ky. 1904).
, Id. at 573.
42Id. at 574.
" See City of Ashland v. Calvary Protestant Episcopal Church, 278 S.W.2d 708
(Ky. 1955); Calvary Baptist Church v. Milliken, 147 S.W. 12 (Ky. 1912); Broadway
Christian Church v. Commonwealth, 66 S.W. 32 (Ky. 1902).
1, Ky. Op. ATr'y GE.N. 65-767 (1965).
"Religious use is the important criterion. Thus when a church rents property to
another church, the exemption applies if the property is used for religious purposes.
Ky. Op. ArT'y GEN. 65-825 (1965).
1, Church of the Good Shephard v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W. 894 (Ky. 1918).
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mographic, economic, and social changes since that time," the
draft constitution submitted to the voters in 1966 was overwhelmingly rejected."
After considering several proposals to increase, decrease,
or drop altogether the maximum holdings limitation for religious organizations, the Assembly retained the existing acreage
exemptions.4 9 The Assembly decided to let the present section
170 stand unchanged on the basis that all income-producing
property, including that held by churches, is already, and
should be, taxed. 0 While this reasoning is true for strictly religious organizations, income-producing property which is devoted to non-profit charitable or educational institutions enjoys a tax-exempt status.
Perhaps another reason that the provisions of section 170
were left unaltered by the Assembly was the fact that revenue
from property taxes no longer formed a substantial portion of
Kentucky's total state government revenue. Whereas property
taxes had provided fifty-eight percent of Kentucky's total revenue in 1920, they provided only six percent in 1950.' Before
1936, two-thirds of the state's general revenue resulted from
property taxes and a three percent sales tax. An attempt was
made to relieve the state's taxpayers of the property tax burden
between 1934 and 1936. Unequal assessments and declining
property values had increased property tax burdens during the
Depression and alternative revenue sources were used to replace the property tax." While local governments still derive
most of their revenue from property taxes, the Assembly decided not to raise once again the controversial issue of religious
tax exemptions.
" For example, in 1890 only 19.2% of Kentucky's population lived in urban areas,
but by 1960 the urban population was 44.5% of the total. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN No. 52, A COMPARISON . . . THE PRESENT, THE PROPOSED KENTUCKY CONSTITUTIONS

58 (1966).

Louisville Courier-Journal, Nov. 9, 1966, § A, at 1, col. 6.
"LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, supra note 47, at 75-76.
50Id. at 76.
"1

LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION,

RESEARCH PUBLICATION

TION-PROPERTY TAXES 1 (1951).
52 LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, RESEARCH PUBLICATION
TION-THE OVER-ALL PICTURE 4-5 (1951).

No. 18, TAXA-

No. 15,

TAXA-
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1972 Senate Resolution

More recently, churches have been taking a hard look at
their own policies on the subject of taxation. Several church
policy statements contain recommendations that churches not
seek exemptions from property taxes other than for property
used primarily for religious purposes, and that churches should
be willing to pay their share of the cost of the municipal services they receive, such as fire, police, and sanitation services.-3
One of these policy statements notes that regardless of the
theoretical premises of tax exemption for religious institutions,,
exemption from taxation is not justified to the extent of the
cost to the government of such services, and preferential treatment as to some property is unfair to other institutions. 4 Another statement recommends that their congregations "make
appropriate contribution, in lieu of taxes, for essential services
provided by government" in order to extricate the church from
a position of obligation to the state by virtue of special tax
privileges extended to it."
A number of these policy statements base their recommendations on the view that religious freedom requires that the
government show no favoritism to any religious group. Discrimination in favor of churches in the matter of taxation and discrimination against religious groups are viewed as being
equally pernicious.
However, the various policy statements on the whole favor
a more generous religious tax exemption than is allowed by the
constitution of Kentucky. For example, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs Conference issued a statement that
13 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE U.S., TAX EXEMPTION OF

CHURCHES, §§ 34.11-.13 (May 2, 1969).
Also in this connection, see the various policy statements which appear in A. BALK,
THE RELIGION BUSINESS 57-96 (1968), which includes the following: National Council
of Churches' Study Conference Report (1964); Methodist Church Study Commission
Report (1968); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S. Special Committee Report
(1963); American Lutheran Church Policy Statement (1966); Guild of St. Ives Report
(1967); Baptist Joint Committee Conference Report (1960); and statements of the
Catholic Press (1964-1967).
m BALK, supra note 53, at 58 (Report of the National Study Conference on Church
and State).
m Id. at 61-66 (Report of a Study Commission on the Methodist Church and
Church-Government Relations). For a contrary view, see D.M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES
SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES (1977).
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"[d]enominational offices should be exempt inasmuch as they
are a valid extension of the work of the local church," and that
parking lots should be exempt unless used to produce income."
In 1972, religious leaders in Kentucky were successful in
their efforts to get a resolution on religious property tax policy
passed by the Kentucky Senate. In part the resolution states
that section 170 of the constitution does not adequately provide
for the "modern church with its place for religious worship,
education, charity, recreation, administration, and parking,"
and that the changes necessary to meet these requirements of
the church "would not decrease the tax revenue for the government since the churches are not now taxed.

57

The resolution

states that the religious tax exemption in section 170 should
"cover the exemption of places owned by religious institutions
and used for religious, educational, charitable or administrative purposes, including the grounds attached thereto."5 The
resolution was an attempt to extend the religious tax exemption to property used for religious purposes.
However, "religious purposes" is not a phrase used in the
constitutional provisions for exemption. Section 170 is very
explicit in allowing exemption only for the places of worship
and the ground attached thereto, within certain acreage limitations, and for the home of the minister, again with acreage
restrictions. In addition, notwithstanding the wording of the
resolution, it seems clear that property tax revenues would
have decreased if the resolution had become law, since the
resolution not only eliminated the acreage restrictions, but also
enlarged the scope of exempted property by including places
used for administrative purposes.
In any event, the resolution had no capacity to change the
wording or effect of section 170. It merely expressed the mind
of the 1972 legislature on the subject of church property tax
exemptions. The Very Reverend Charles Maloney, auxiliary
bishop of the Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville and one of the
backers of the resolution, felt that the resolution was of value
mostly to the educational institutions with connections to ex" BAmL,supra note 53, at 78 (Conference Report-Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs).
-7 Ky. S. Res. 39, reprinted in Ky. SENATE JouRNAL, 625-26 (1972).
,s Id.
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empted religious organizations. 9 However, those institutions
are already exempt under the broader and more liberal provisions of section 170 relating to charitable and educational institutions. The resolution may well have been a model for a later
proposed constitutional amendment to section 170, which used
essentially the same language as that found in the resolution.
C. Attempted ConstitutionalAmendment
The 1972 Assembly of the Kentucky Council of Churches
authorized the formation of a task force on church property
taxation, which was constituted in August 1972. The task force
recommended to the 1973 Assembly of the Kentucky Council
of Churches that a constitutional amendment be submitted to
the General Assembly. The amended section 170 would alter
the acreage limitation, and extend the permissible uses for exempt property:
[P]laces owned by religious societies and actually used for
religious worship with the grounds attached thereto and used
and appurtenant to the house of worship, not exceeding seven
acres; places owned by religious societies and actually used
for educational, charitable or administrativepurposes, including the grounds attached thereto ....
1
The reason given by the task force for the attempted
amendment was the "present inconsistent approach to church
taxation in Kentucky by local tax commissions.""1 The task
force did not make clear whether the "inconsistent approach"
was among tax commissions of different localities, tax commissions in the same locality at different points in time, or whether
the term referred to the fact that exemption for religious property is dealt with differently from the charitable and educational exemptions. The annual review of all real property exempt under section 170, required by statute,12 is a possible
source of the inconsistency.
Nevertheless, in April 1974, after a meeting with then GovTelephone interview with Bishop Maloney (Feb. 15, 1977).

, Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Task Force of Church Property Taxation-Kentucky Council of Churches (Dec. 17, 1973) (emphasis added).
"
2

Id.

Ky. REv. STAT. § 132.220 (5), (6) (1971).
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ernor Ford, the task force agreed that the proposed constitutional amendment should not be pursued at that time. The
Governor had suggested several reasons for delaying, among
which were the need for a major publicity campaign before
continuing with the amendment procedure, the opposition of
the labor force at the time to tax exemption for any group,13 and
the poor track record of constitutional amendments previously
presented to Kentucky voters. 4 Church leadership was fearful
that failure of the proposed amendment would be taken by tax
assessors as a mandate to add more church property to the tax
rolls. The decision not to proceed with the amendment was
supported by the Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, which
stated that the "best counsel that our office has been able to
find has advised against attempting to clarify our status by
means of an amendment because we are not likely to succeed
and because of the danger that we will lose the exemption that
' 65
we are now accorded.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion shows that it was the intention of
the framers of the Kentucky Constitution, after lengthy and
sophisticated debate, that religious institutions be treated as
distinct from charitable or educational institutions regarding
property tax exemptions and that religious property tax exemptions be extended as a matter of right, not merely as acceptable policy. The courts have consistently enforced this intent and the wording of the constitution precludes any further
extension of tax exemptions by state and local statutes and
ordinances.
In view of the increased demands upon state and municipal governments to provide more services for more people and
the consequently rising cost of government, it is unlikely that
Kentucky will abandon its practical attitude in this area. The
'3 Minutes of the Task Force on Church Property Taxation-Kentucky Council
of Churches (Apr. 25, 1974).
" There have been 53 attempts to amend the constitution since its adoption in
1891. Only 22 have been successful. LEGISLA71VE RasEARCH COUSSION, supra note 6,
at i.
. Letter from the Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville (Nov. 24, 1974). A copy of
this letter was kindly made available to the author by the Catholic Archdiocese.
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"fee for services" trade-off emphasized at the Constitutional
Convention requires balancing church services against the need
to maintain a broad tax base.
Religious organizations with charitable or educational
branches enjoy a tax-exempt status for those branches unrestricted by use or acreage limitations. This is justified by the
services to the community such institutions provide. To provide this broad exemption for religious societies which do not
provide such services the courts must find that they are charitable institutions in and of themselves, or that the services they
provide, such as moral education and the dissemination of values, are of a charitable or educational nature. Kentucky courts
are reluctant to stretch section 170 to such an extent, so that
the only chance for these institutions to acquire a broader exemption is through amendment of section 170 or revision of the
entire constitution. Either process would require a massive
educational campaign to convince the voters of the virtues of
such a course of action.
It is in Kentucky's best interests to retain the provisions
of section 170 as they now stand. Section 170 leaves a sufficiently broad tax base. If one accepts the rationale that services
provided by institutions enjoying tax-exempt status would otherwise have to be provided by government, the exemptions
contained in section 170 are reasonable and justified. To accord
to religious organizations as such the treatment accorded charitable and educational institutions would tend to eliminate a
great amount of property from the tax base at a time of rising
demand for municipal services and rising costs. Such a course
of action would be both fiscally and politically unsound.

